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The usual definitions of illusions, as incorrect perceptions or cases of discrepancies 
between reality and our perception of reality, have been criticized as inadequate. The reason 
is that it is not clear how to apply this notion in a number of interesting cases. This paper 
is an attempt to provide an adequate definition of illusions, appropriate for many classical 
phenomena usually referred to as illusions.
Illusions of the senses are usually thought of as instances of non-veridical 
(incorrect) perception, or cases of discrepancies between reality and our perception 
of reality, when we do not perceive objects as they actually are. However, such a 
notion of illusion was criticized by pointing out that it is not clear how to apply 
this concept consistently in a number of interesting cases (see Morgan, 1996; 
Rogers, 2010, 2014). For example, is all perception of color illusory, given that 
there are features of spectral luminance distributions that are not recoverable 
by our color mechanisms? Does a pair of flat stereo images that mimic the 
actual input to the two eyes from a 3D body provide a veridical or an illusory 
experience of depth? In what precise sense does our perception deviate from 
reality in illusions? What would it even mean to experience the world veridically, 
as it ’actually’ is in reality? Such questions suggest that the notion of illusions is 
muddled and should perhaps be dismissed as a scientifically useless concept.
My goal here is to show that this concept can in fact be properly defined 
in such a manner that it applies for some salient cases of illusions, that is, for a 
set of phenomena which includes a number of classical and well-known effects 
traditionally explicitly labeled as illusions. Namely, the notions of correct / incorrect 
perceptions as instances of agreement / disagreement of perception with reality 
can be defined as follows: perception is illusory when two objects are physically 
equal with respect to some feature but appear different, and also when they are 
physically different but appear equal; perception is veridical when two objects are 
physically equal with respect to some feature and appear equal, and also when 
they are physically different and appear different. A four-part scheme or format 
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will be used for the illustration of this definition, with the help of which cases of 
veridicality and illusions can be presented in a systematic manner. Examples of 
the application of this scheme, adapted from Todorović (2010, 2014), will first be 
provided for some illusions of size, orientation and lightness.
The Ebbinghaus illusion. As the first example, consider Figure 1, which is 
divided into four panels. In panel 1a there are two disks that have equal physical 
size, which also look equal (or certainly very similar) in size. In panel 1c there 
are also two disks, one of which is the same as in panel 1a and the other which is 
physically somewhat larger (its radius is 20% longer), and also looks a bit larger. In 
these two panels reality and appearance are in agreement, in the sense that objects 
appear as they are: when they are the same they look the same (panel 1a), and 
when they are different they look different (panel 1c). Cases of such agreement of 
physical and phenomenal features are instances of veridical perception.
Figure 1. The Ebbinghaus illusion. Two equal disks (panel a) appear different when 
surrounded by disks of different size (panel b). Two different disks (panel c) appear same 
or approximately same when surrounded by disks of different size (panel d).
Consider now panel 1b. It contains the same two physically equal disks 
as in panel 1a. However, in this panel they are surrounded by additional disks, 
forming two different contexts: in one case the surrounding disks are larger than 
the central disk and in the other case the surrounding disks are smaller. The 
two different contexts cause the two identical central disks to appear different: 
the central disk surrounding by larger disks looks smaller than the central 
disk surrounded by smaller disks. This is an example of a well-known visual 
illusion, named after Hermann Ebbinghaus. In spite of the fact that the observer 
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words, this visual effect is cognitively impenetrable. On the other hand, in panel 
1d the situation is in a sense opposite than in panel 1b. Here the two central 
disks are the same as the two physically different disks in panel 1c, but the 
surrounding disks are the same as in panel 1b; thus panels 1b and 1d have the 
same constituents, except for the central disk surrounded by larger disks, which 
is physically larger in panel 1d than in panel 1b. In panel 1d the two central 
disks appear approximately similar in size, although physically they are different 
(and although in panel 1c this difference is noticeable). The physical difference 
in size is perceptual compensated by the difference of the two contexts, that is, 
the presence of different surrounding disks. In sum, in panels 1b and 1d reality 
and appearance are not in agreement. Objects that are physically equal appear 
different (panel 1b) and, conversely, objects that are physically different appear 
the same or very similar (panel 1d). Cases of such disagreement of physical and 
phenomenal features are instances of illusory perception.
Note that the configuration in panel 1b is useful to demonstrate the 
illusion, since it is easily shown that the disks are physically the same but 
appear different. On the other hand, the configuration in panel 1d is useful to 
measure the illusion, since it is easy to establish the difference in physical size 
of two objects that appear equal (or very similar) in size. How big the physical 
difference needs to be for the disks to appear equal is an empirical matter, 
established in experiments, for example by asking subjects to vary the size of the 
central disk surrounded by larger disks until it perceptually matches in size the 
other central disk.
The Zöllner illusion. Figure 2 contains an example involving perception of 
orientation, presented in the same general format as the size illusion in Figure 1. 
Panel 2a contains two parallel lines, which also look parallel. Panel 2c contains 
two lines which are not parallel and also don’t look parallel; their orientations 
are different, and the lines subtend an angle of 3 degrees, converging from left 
to right. Panel 2b contains the same two parallel lines as in panel 1a, but here 
they are presented in the context of additional short crossing lines, which have 
different orientations for the two lines. The consequence is the well-known 
Zöllner illusion: the parallel lines don’t appear as parallel but as diverging from 
left to right. Panel 2d contains the same two converging lines as in panel 2c, but 
crossed with the same two sets of short lines as in panel 2b. In this panel the 
two lines appear parallel or nearly so, or at least more parallel than the same 
two lines in panel 2c. The difference in the orientations of the two lines, that is, 
their physical convergence, is perceptually compensated by the illusion-inducing 
effect of the different orientations of the crossing lines, causing the perception of 
their divergence. Similarly as in Figure 1, panel 2b is useful for demonstrating 
the illusion, since it is easily shown that the perceptually converging lines are 
physically parallel, and panel 2d is useful for measuring the illusion, since it 
is easy to establish the difference in physical orientation of the two parallel-
appearing lines, although the required angle may be somewhat different for 
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Figure 2. The Zöllner illusion. Two parallel lines (panel a) don’t appear parallel when 
crossed by short lines of different orientations (panel b). Two non-parallel lines (panel c) 
appear approximately parallel when crossed by short lines of different orientations (panel d).
The simultaneous lightness contrast illusion. Figure 3 presents an example 
from the domain of lightness perception. Panel 3a contains two disks with the 
same luminance (amount of reflected light). They also look the same in lightness 
(perceived shade of gray). In panel 3c one disk is the same as in panel 3a, but 
the luminance of the other disk is higher, and the two disks, correctly, appear 
to have to have different shades of gray. Panel 3b contains the same physically 
equal disks from panel 3a, but here they are placed on backgrounds of different 
luminance. As a consequence of this difference of contexts the disks appear 
different, such that the one on the darker background looks lighter; this is an 
instance of the simultaneous lightness contrast illusion. Panel 3d contains the 
two different disks from panel 3c, but placed on two different backgrounds, 
same as in panel 3b. As a consequence, the two disks appear much more similar 
in lightness in this panel than in panel 3c.
Figure 3. The simultaneous lightness contrast illusion. Two disks of the same luminance 
(panel a) appear differently light when placed on different surrounds (panel b). Two disks 
of different luminance (panel c) appear similarly light when placed on different surrounds 
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The presentations of the three illusions from different perceptual domains 
(size, orientation, lightness) have shared the same format. The two objects in the 
first row are physically the same in both panels (a, b), and in the second row 
they are physically different in both panels (c, d). In the first column the two 
objects are placed in the same context in both panels (a, c), and in the second 
column they are placed in different contexts in the two panels (b, d). The two 
objects appear equal (or approximately equal) with respect to some attribute 
in two panels (a, d), and appear different in the two other panels (b, c). The 
perceptual judgments agree with physical reality when objects are in the same 
contexts (a, c); these are cases of veridical perception. Reality and perception 
disagree when the objects are placed in different contexts (b, d); these are cases 
of illusory perception.
Two types of object features were invoked in this discussion, as well as 
two types of relations between them. The two types of features were physical 
features (size, orientation, luminance), as measured by physical instruments 
(measuring tape, protractor, photometer), and perceptual features (perceived size, 
perceived orientation, lightness), as assessed by recording observer judgments. 
The relations were comparisons of physical features (physical equality and 
physical difference) and comparisons of perceptual features (perceived equality 
and perceived difference). Furthermore, the two comparisons were themselves 
compared by establishing whether they agree or disagree, with two possible 
outcomes. First, the physical comparison and the perceptual comparison could 
agree with each other; this could happen in two ways, when the two objects 
were both physically equal and perceptually equal (panel a), and also when the 
two objects were both physically and perceptually different (panel c). Second, 
the two comparisons could disagree with each other; this could also happen in 
two ways, when the two objects were physically equal but perceptually different 
(panel b), and when, conversely, the two objects were physically different 
but perceptually equal (panel d). The first outcome corresponds to veridical 
perception and the second outcome corresponds to illusory perception. In this 
way both veridical and illusory perception are defined for this class of stimuli.
Three illusions were used as illustrations here, but many other classical 
visual illusions can also be presented in the exact same way (and several were 
presented in this manner in Todorović, 2010, 2014). They include size illusions 
such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, the Sander illusion and the Ponzo illusion, 
location illusions such as the Judd illusion and the Oppel-Thiéry-Wundt illusion, 
orientation and shape illusions such as the Café wall illusion and the Hering-
Wundt illusion, direction illusions such as the Poggendorff illusion, as well as 
some lightness and color illusions.
The purpose of the preceding considerations was to show how the notions 
of veridical and illusory perception can be defined clearly and unambiguously, 
using a general formal presentation scheme applicable to many classical 
illusions. However, not all illusions can be presented in exactly this way, nor are 
all phenomena that can be presented in this format necessarily illusions. Namely, ON THE NOTION OF VISUAL ILLUSIONS 364
the above scheme is tailored to illustrate effects of context, but not all illusions 
are necessarily context effects, nor are all context effects necessarily illusions, 
as illustrated below.
The vertical-horizontal illusion. Figure 4 is an attempt to present 
the horizontal-vertical illusions in the above format, but it is only partially 
successful. As in the previous examples, the two objects in panel 4a are the 
same and look the same (in length) and in panel 4c they are different and look 
different. In panel 4b the two lines have the same length but the vertical line 
looks longer; this is an instance of the well-known vertical-horizontal illusion. 
Finally, in panel 4d the two lines have the same lengths as in panel 4c, that is, 
they are different, but look the same (or very similar in length).
Figure 4. The horizontal-vertical illusion. Two lines of same length (panel a) appear 
differently long when one is horizontal and the other is vertical (panel b). Two lines of 
different lengths (panel c) appear equally or similarly long when one is horizontal and the 
other is vertical (panel d).
The issue here is that, unlike in the previous examples, the pairs of objects 
in panels 4a and 4b are not physically identical in every way except for the 
different contexts, since they also differ in orientation and mutual spatial relation; 
the same is true for the pairs of objects in panels 4c and 4d. Furthermore, again 
unlike in the previous examples, it is not appropriate to describe the pairs of 
lines in panels 4a and 4c as being in the same context, and as being in different 
contexts in panels 4c and 4d. However, although this phenomenon thus does not 
quite fit the above formal scheme, it nevertheless still is properly described as 
an illusion, because objects that are the same with respect to a feature (here size) 
appear as being different (panel 4b), and vice versa (panel 4d).
An alternative way to present this illusion would be to turn line CD by 90o 
in panels 4a and 4c. However, although in this case the pairs of lines in panels 
4a and 4b, as well as in panels 4c and 4d, would be more similar than in current 
Figure 4, they still would not be identical. Furthermore, in this arrangement the 
lines AB and CD in panel 4a, with the same length but different orientation, 
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present, although in a weaker form, even when the two lines do not touch in the 
form of an inverted T, as in panel 4b.
The Wollaston effect. Figure 5 presents a converse case compared to 
figure 4, in that it follows the above format, but does not necessarily involve an 
illusion. The objects are pairs of pairs of eyes in cartoon faces. In panel 5a the 
two eye pairs are identical (with irises centered in the eye opening), and are also 
presented in the same context, meaning that they are both placed symmetrically 
within the ellipses that represent head outlines. The perceptual feature of interest 
here is the perceived direction of gaze of the two faces, which is the same. In 
panel 5c the two eye pairs are also placed symmetrically within the head outline 
but are not identical (irises are centered in one eye pair but shifted rightwards 
in the other pair), and they are also not perceived to gaze in the same direction. 
Panel 5b contains the same two identical pairs of eyes as panel 5a, but here 
they are presented in two different contexts: in one face the eyes are positioned 
symmetrically, as in panel 5a, and in the other face they are both (together 
with the ‘nose’ and the ‘mouth’) shifted leftwards, towards the oval outline. In 
consequence the two faces are not perceived to gaze in the same direction: one 
face appears to look at the observer, and the other appears to look leftwards. 
This is an instance of the Wollaston (1824) effect. Finally, panel 5d contains 
the same two different pairs of eyes as panel 5c, but presented in the same two 
different contexts as in panel 5b. Here both faces seem to look in the same or 
nearly the same direction, at the observer.
Figure 5. The Wollaston effect. Two faces with eyes with same positions of irises (panel 
a) appear to look in different directions when the eyes are placed in different positions 
within the head outline (panel b). Two faces with eyes with different positions of irises 
(panel c) appear to look in same or similar directions when the eyes are placed in different 
positions within the head outline (panel d).ON THE NOTION OF VISUAL ILLUSIONS 366
Although the Wollaston effect is often classified as an illusion, I have 
argued that it is not (Todorović, 2014). Note that the placement of the eyes 
within the oval outline can be regarded as a crude but effective way to convey 
the orientation of the head for cartoon faces: symmetrical placement is a cue 
that the head is oriented frontally, whereas sideways placement is a cue that 
the head is tilted. Thus in panel 5b, although the pairs of eyes are the same (the 
irises are in the same relative positions within the eye opening), they belong 
to two differently oriented heads. In such a case it is only logical that the gaze 
directions would be different, because the eyes are in the head and have to turn 
together with it, even when they themselves don’t move with respect to the 
head; therefore the fact that the perceived gaze directions are different is not an 
illusion. Conversely, in panel 5d the face in which the head is turned leftwards 
and the eyes rightwards is as legitimate a case of gazing at the observer as the 
other face in which the head is frontal and the eyes symmetrical; therefore the 
fact that the gaze directions are perceived as same (or very similar) is also not 
an illusion.
One possible criticism of the definition of veridical and illusory perception 
proposed above is that some illusions may not necessarily be presented as 
comparisons of two objects. For example, the Zöllner illusion may be illustrated 
with an example in which a horizontal line crossed with small oblique lines 
does not look horizontal but tilted. This case does not involve comparison of 
orientation of two lines but judgment of orientation of a single line. However, 
as shown above, this phenomenon can also be presented as a comparison of two 
lines, thus fitting the proposed definition. It remains to be shown whether such a 
procedure is feasible for other types of illusions.
Another possible criticism concerns one of the four possibilities in the 
above scheme, that is, the claim that the case when two objects are different and 
also appear different is a case of veridical perception (panel c). The problem is 
that such a notion of veridicality seems to be too coarse-grained, particularly 
when compared to the other case of veridical perception, when two objects are 
equal and also appear equal (panel a). However, this difference is a consequence 
of an asymmetry between the relations of equality and inequality, in that, given 
an object, the potential set of objects equal to it is more restricted that the 
potential set of objects different from it.
The proposed definition invokes only the relations of equality and 
inequality. Borrowing a term from the domain of measurement scales, such 
relations are only nominal. However, perceptual judgments are not restricted 
to claims of equality and inequality. Thus an object can be judged not just as 
different in length from another object, but also as longer or shorter (ordinal 
judgment), or, although such tasks are rarely used in psychophysical experiments, 
as twice or half as long (ratio judgments), or being 5 cm long and the other being 
6 cm long. Such judgments can be correct or incorrect, thus being veridical or 
illusory. Although such aspects could be taken into account in a more developed Dejan Todorović 367
definition of illusions, for the present purposes of strengthening the conceptual 
basis of this notion, relying only on judgments of (in)equality, as proposed 
above, appears sufficient. Further considerations will be needed to establish 
whether this approach is useful to decide about the applicability of the notion of 
illusion in more complex and problematic cases.
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